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A National Court of Appeals*
By PAUL A. FREuND**

THE mission of the Supreme Court is as unique as it is essential: in
the decision of actual controversies, to advance, clarify and rationalize the law for an entire nation, and to do so through opinions that
are as invulnerable and persuasive as they can be made by research,
reflection, collaboration, mutual criticism and accommodation. Does
the caseload of the Court present a problem for the effective performance of that function? If so, what measures of relief would be most
appropriate? Those are our two questions, and I shall address myself
briefly to both of them.
In 1959, Justice Harlan, after four years on the Supreme Court,
expressed his concern over the Court's capacity to discharge its responsibilities under the mounting caseload of petitions for certiorari:
At the time the Act of 1925 was passed the rapid growth of the
Court's certioraribusiness could hardly have been foreseen. During the past eight Terms the number of petitions dealt with by
the Court has grown from about 1,000 to approximately 1,500.
Increasingly, the -time required to handle the certiorariwork and
that needed for adjudication of cases, and more particularly for
the writing of opinions, are coming into competition. This is
something that gives food for thought. On the one hand, the willingness of Congress to relinquish to the Court what in practical
effect amounts to control of its appellate docket naturally presupposed that the Court would exercise this responsibility with a
proper degree of deliberation. . . . On the other hand, certiorari would be self-defeating if its demands upon the Court's time
were allowed to impinge upon the processes involved in the adjudication of cases. For after all the Court exists to decide cases,
and certiorariis but an ancillary process designed to promote the
appropriate discharge of that duty. It would be most unfortunate
were the demands of certioraripermitted to lessen the number of
cases on its calendar which the Court had time to decide, to consider on a plenary basis, or to dispose of with full-scale opinions.
* The present paper is adapted from remarks at the annual meeting of the
American Bar Association in Philadelphia, August 7, 1973.
** Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Harvard Law School.
[1301]

1302

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

It would be still more serious if the demands of certiorari should
ever reach the point of making significant inroads in the time
which individual members of the Court can afford to devote to reflection upon the decision of important issues. I think it can fairly
be said that none of these things has come about so far ...
While it can . . . be said that the certiorariwork, despite its con-

tinuing growth, is still within manageable proportions, it would be
shortsighted not to recognize that preserving the system in good
health, and keeping it in proper balance with the other work of
the Court, are matters that will increasingly demand thoughtful
and imaginative attention.'
Since the halcyon days of 1959, when Justice Harlan spoke, the
docket has swelled from 1500 to over 4600 cases, of which over 3700
were newly filed during the term. The increase is not explainable
simply as an increase in the in forma pauperis filings. Those have
indeed risen dramatically, but the paid cases have risen almost
as rapidly-from 890 new filings in 1961 to 1713 in 1971-almost
doubled in a decade. At the same time, the number of petitions
granted has remained substantially level, so that the percentage of
grants has dropped overall from 17.5 percent in 1941 to 11.1 percent
in 1951 to 7.4 percent in 1961 and 5.8 percent in 1971. The paid
petitions granted dropped from 19.4 percent to 15.4 percent to 13.4
2
percent to 8.9 percent during the same period.
But statistics are only the beginning of an assessment. After listening to every member of the present Court on the subject of the
current caseload, the Study Group appointed by the chief justice under
the auspices of the Federal Judicial Center concluded without dissent
and without doubt that there was a serious problem-though not every
member of the Study Group had come to the assignment with that
preconception. One member of the Court, to be sure, stated to us,
as he has stated publicly before and since, that the Court is vastly
underworkedY But it is fair to say that he is, in a number of ways,
an exceptional judge.
Our judgment that, put conservatively, the Court has reached the
saturation point, did not rest on the views merely of the newer jus1. Harlan, Some Aspects of the Judicial Process in the Supreme Court of the
United States, 33 AusTRA ANL.J. 108, 113-14 (1959).
2. The figures are taken from the Report of the Study Group on the Case Load

of the Supreme Court (1972).

Copies are available from the Federal Judicial Center,

Washington, D.C.

3. See, e.g., Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 174-78 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Douglas, noting his dissents from denials of certiorari, would have had the Court hear some 460 cases per term, beyond the approximately 175 actually taken. See A. BIcKEL, THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT
26-27 (1973).
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tices. One of the senior justices remarked sadly and trenchantly that
decision-making had become for the Court an event rather than a process. Another senior judge was able to cope with the docket because
he had given up all outside activities-lecturing, writing, summer institutes-and worked evenings as well; because of his experience, he
explained, he is able to consider petitions now in the same time as
he required for half the number when he began (it is difficult to see
on this evidence how he could perform the function if he were newly
appointed today). Another senior justice observed that when he
came to the Supreme Court from another court he thought that now
he would be able, as he had not been before, to plumb every case
to its bottom; that proved to be an illusion, he acknowledged, since
the load was even greater on the Supreme Court. But, he said, you
learn to numb yourself to it. In this sense, of course, the caseload
is not impossible or intolerable. That conclusion is hardly reassuring.
One justice who has not numbed himself to it is Mr. Justice Powell. In April of last year, at the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference,
he said:
The conditions cited in the Committee's [study group's] report pose
the question whether the Court can continue acceptably to discharge [its] responsibility. As a new member of the Court, moving there directly from a long experience at the bar, I can say
without qualification that I find the situation disquieting. Near the
beginning of its Report, the Committee made this perceptive comment: "The indispensable condition for the discharge of the
Court's responsibility is adequate time and ease of mind for research, reflection, and consultation in reaching a judgment, for
critical review by colleagues when a draft opinion is prepared and
for clarification and revision in light of all that has gone before." (p. 1)
This indispensable condition simply does not exist. Petitions
are filed with us on the average of 70/75 per week, 52 weeks
in the year; each Justice is responsible for a personal judgment
as to every petition, however much he may delegate to his clerks;
these petitions vary in size from a few pages in a frivolous IFP
to printed records of many thousands of pages, with multiple
briefs; we will hear arguments in some 175 cases, write opinions
for the Court (in addition to per curiams) in some 130, plus scores
of concurrences and dissents; each Justice must review and take
a reasoned position on all circulated opinions; we have all-day conferences vitually every Friday; and each of us has substantial responsibilities as a Circuit Justice. . ..
But in all truth, my concern is not personal. As I said to
our colleagues on the Fourth Circuit last summer, I have worked
6 to 6Y2 days per week throughout my professional career. My
concern therefore is for the Court as an institution. It is one we
all revere. Its problems, addressed by the Freund Committee,
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now merit the best thinking of our profession. 4
And Chief Justice Burger, addressing the American Law Institute
in May, 1973, was equally frank:
Until someone perfects an eight- or nine-day week or a thirtyhour day, the enormous increase in the Court's work over the past
twenty years must produce undue stress somewhere and ultimately
affect -the quality of the product. To wait to do something about
this problem until someone can empirically demonstrate that three
or four thousand cases cannot be processed as well as one thousand is not my conception of how we on the Court should fulfill
our responsibility to the Court as an institution. 5
The Court is, to be sure, abreast of its docket. We are all familiar with the two great crunches that help to keep it so. The first
crunch is at the beginning of term, when 800 or 900 petitions and
appeals, the summer carry-over, are disposed of in a few days. (Of
course not all are actually considered at conference; only about 30 percent are put on the "discuss" list, the others being denied because
no justice votes to consider them at conference. But every justice
must make up his mind on every application and must presumably be
prepared to discuss the 30 percent of 800 or 900 during the few days
of conferences). The second crunch is at the close of term when in a
few weeks dozens of major decisions are handed down, usually with
a spate of separate opinions, suggesting, to paraphrase Cicero, that if
there had been more time there would have been, if not shorter, at
any rate fewer opinions.
The Court has already taken a number of remedial measures, and
so, incidentally, has confirmed the existence of a genuine problem.
The time for oral argument has been reduced to a half hour. A third
law clerk for each justice was provided, at the Court's request, in
1969. Records have been dispensed with on petitions for certiorari
(making the inexorable weekly tide of paper in seventy-five cases look
less formidable, but at a cost in less informed and even improvident
actions by the Court). Recently four or five justices have pooled the
law-clerk resource, using one law clerk to screen and write memoranda on petitions for the bloc of justices.
Another internal change that has been suggested, but not in fact
adopted, is the use of panels for the consideration of petitions for certiorari. No longer would every justice pass upon every petition, pur4. Address of Mr. Justice Powell before the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference,
El Paso, Texas, April 11, 1973.
5. Burger, Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice Burger Defends
Freund Study Group's Compilation and Proposal,59 A.B.A.J. 721, 723 (1973).
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suant to the assurance given to Congress at the time the Judiciary Act
of 1925 was enacted. This has been a sensitive point, as Justice
Holmes recognized four years after the act came into force, when he
confided in a letter to Sir Frederick Pollock:
We have to consider the certioraribecause it was only after
effort that we got a bill passed that makes an appeal to our court
dependent upon our discretion in many cases in which until lately it
was a matter of right. Let it ever be understood that the preliminary judgment was delegated, I should expect the law to be changed
back again very quickly with the result that we should have to hear
many cases that have
no right to our time; as it is we barely keep
6
up with the work.
The use of panels composed of three justices for the purpose of
dividing the task of examining petitions and jurisdictional statements
would not, the Study Group believed, be acceptable to the profession
or the public. Moreover, while some saving of time would be achieved,
the gain would be all too slight. At the present level of filings,
using the conservative figure of 3750, each panel (and therefore each
justice) would consider about 1250 applications for review. It is
assumed that where there was a division within the panel (two votes
for or against a grant), and possibly where there was a solid vote of
three to grant review, the case would be referred to the full Court
and taken up at its conference. About 30 percent of all petitions now
go to conference because at least one justice so votes. If anything,
a panel procedure is likely to increase this percentage, since a justice
serving on a panel would presumably be more liberal in his view of
review-worthiness in order not to keep marginal cases from the attention of the other six justices. If we posit a rate of 40 percent of the
total applications for referral to the full Court, we arrive at a number
of about fifteen hundred that would require the attention of each justice, of which two-thirds, or one thousand, would be new to him, over
and beyond his initial consideration of about 1250.
An alternative internal procedural change that has been advanced
is the creation of a small senior staff that would do the preliminary
screening. Such a measure is, I believe, the one most likely to be
adopted if relief in the form of a National Court of Appeals is not provided. The effectiveness, or "success," of a senior staff would depend
on the substantial acceptance of its recommendations, growing out of
confidence in its judgment. Such a development-and, in some measure,
the use of panels-would be the natural response of a bureaucracy to its
increasingly heavy responsibilities: more and more delegation within
6.

2 HOLMEs-PoLLocK LErna's 251 (M. Howe ed. 1942).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

the organization, the while clinging to the nominal responsibility at the
top, thereby widening the gap between the function and its discharge.
That course, it is submitted, is exactly the wrong direction for
the Supreme Court to take. Justice Brandeis in plain language explained the prestige of the Court by saying, "we do our own work." Some
commentators on the Report of the Study Group have accused us of
violating our own principle by proposing to "delegate," as they put
it, part of the Supreme Court's work to another agency. But, with
respect, that comment completely misses the point. The point is one
of principle, even, it is not too much to say, of official morality. A
National Court of Appeals would have its own authoritative responsibilities. It would be a visible, legitimated tribunal also "doing its own
work," albeit work that would relieve the Supreme Court of some of
its burden. Appearance and reality in decision-making would coincide. We would not be fostering an illusion of responsibility, as we
are likely to be doing if a way out is sought through greater assignment of functions to a permanent senior staff.
The Study Group turned its attention, then, from internal procedural changes to the question: Of what functions could the Court most
appropriately be relieved? The Group put aside the idea of specialized courts of appeals, not because in some fields (taxation, for example) a good case might not be made for them, but because they
would have only a marginal effect on the Supreme Court's caseload.
An exception would be a national court of criminal appeals, provided
its denials of review were made final, since applications for direct and
collateral review of criminal convictions now constitute a majority of
the petitions for review on the Supreme Court's docket. The Study
Group rejected a specialized criminal court for several reasons. Inasmuch as there is a high correlation between criminal cases and petitions in forma pauperis, to single out this category of cases for insulation from Supreme Court review would appear as an invidious classification based on, or coinciding with, the financial plight of the applicant. Moreover, while the absolute percentage of review-worthy cases
in this category is low, the category does contain cases that present
questions of fundamental law second to none in importance. Finally,
there would be a particularly unfortunate risk, in a specialized court
of criminal appeals, of the polarization of its members and the politicization of the appointing process around a single set of issues. A court
of generalists is greatly to be preferred.
Another suggestion-to limit the Supreme Court to so-called constitutional cases-also seemed seriously objectionable: it would re-
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quire new national courts for all nonconstitutional cases; it would be
awkward to administer that bifurcation; it would deprive the Court of
important issues of procedure and statutory construction; it would encourage counsel and perhaps justices to inflate issues to constitutional
dimensions; and it would reinforce the idea of the Court as a superlegislature. Emancipated from the conventional tasks and constraints
of lawyers and judges, who must rub their noses in matters of practice,
of legislative history, and of the harmonious reading of complex codes,
the justices would be led to reinforce the most free-wheeling impulses.
The Study Group focused then on two tasks whose transfer, in
its judgment, would not sacrifice the Court's essential function: preliminary screening of applications for review and the resolution of conflicts between circuits that ought to be resolved but not necessarily
by the Supreme Court. These are the basic functions of the proposed
National Court of Appeals. The court would be expected to pass on
to the Supreme Court some 400 to 500 petitions, from which the
Supreme Court would take for argument about 150 to 175, as at present.
How much time would be saved to the Supreme Court?
As
Justice Rehnquist said in a recent address, he could not quantify it
but he was satisfied that the proposal "would save the Supreme Court
some of the time which it now spends in screening cases and that the
time so saved could be devoted to deliberation and writing opinions.
. ." Instead of the stack of 75 new cases pouring in every week,
ithere would be perhaps ten-certainly a very large difference in psychological scatteration and oppressiveness.
While experience under the proposed plan will furnish the most
reliable data on time saved, an approach to the question can be made
by determining approximately how much time per week is now spent
in the consideration of applications for review. Several of the justices
8
who appeared before the Study Group were able to offer estimates.
One senior member estimated it at one-fifth of his working time. Another senior justice said fifteen hours a week. Still another said up
to a third of his time. A newer member of the Court said two hours
every evening. The time spent is, and should be, considerable. How
much of it will be saved by having, say, six-sevenths of the petitions
7. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: Past and Present, 59 A.B.AJ. 361 (1973).
8. See A. BicKEL, THE CAsELoAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 23 (1973). The
statement of Mr. Justice Douglas made in Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S.
151, 176 (1972) (dissenting opinion), that the Court's time "is largely spent in the
fascinating task of reading petitions for certiorari and jurisdictional statements," is perhaps not intended to be taken seriously.
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screened out in advance cannot be foretold with any precision. While
the more obviously unmeritorious petitions will have been screened
out, leaving the more arguably review-worthy and time-consuming,
among those surviving there will be found some that as clearly merit
review as some that were screened out clearly did not merit it. And,
of course, the saving in pressure, apart from hours and days, would
be no less real for being incommensurable.
How busy or inactive would the National Court of Appeals be?
It would have jurisdiction to grant review and decide on the merits
of cases presenting a conflict of decisions among the circuits. It is
very likely that the National Court of Appeals would decide more such
cases than are now taken by the Supreme Court. If, as seems not
improbable, the new court had time for the decision of still other cases,
the Supreme Court could be empowered to send to it non-conflict cases
that merit review by a national court but not necessarily by the Supreme Court. The new court might, at an estimate, decide on the
merits some one hundred cases a year-surely an important contribution to a body of national law. I envisage an experimental period
and an evolving relationship to the Supreme Court and perhaps indeed an evolving method of selection of the judges of the new court.
What should be the linkage of the National Court of Appeals to
the Supreme Court? It is here that the greatest differences of opinion
have arisen in response to the Study Group's report. Decisions on
the merits by the National Court of Appeals could be made the subject of petitions for certiorari without too great an inroad on the plan
as a whole. It would be expected that very few such petitions would
be granted. If, however, petitions could be filed to review the denials
of certiorari, numbering in the thousands, the plan would clearly be
undermined. The Study Group recommended that denials be made
final.
A countersuggestion has been advanced that the denials lie on
the table of the Supreme Court for, say, sixty days, within which
period the Supreme Court on its own motion might grant review. This
suggestion has a certain plausibility as a compromise between finality
and freedom to file a further petition. The difficulty emerges as a
clear inquiry is made into the lying-on-the-table procedure. What
would be the responsibility of the individual justices toward the several
thousand cases thus open to inspection? Short of engaging in the present procedure, how would certain cases come to the attention of the
justices? Would they resort to chance references, through press accounts, conversation, and the like? Would this ultimate screening
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function be performed by a senior staff about which we have previously expressed reservations? These questions would require clarification as a matter of principle.
It has been argued by some commentators that to make denials
of review final in the National Court of Appeals would destroy the timehonored image of the Supreme Court as the palladium of our liberties,
to which the humblest person has ready access. With the annual filings in the Court approaching 4,000, it has to be asked how meaningful this access really is, and whether a widening breach between symbol and reality will not, so far from maintaining the prestige of the
Court, produce disillusionment and cynicism. It should be asked, also,
whether an arguably meritorious petition will not benefit from being
highlighted through inclusion in the 400 or 500 cases that would survive the initial screening in the Court of Appeals. It must be added,
with respect, that to see in this jurisdictional question an issue of safeIf the vote of three
guarding civil liberties is to lose perspective.
out of seven members of the National Court of Appeals would suffice,
as our Study Group proposed, to certify a petition to the Supreme
Court so that five of seven judges would be required to deny a petition, it is at least as likely that sensitivity to issues of human rights
will actually be enhanced by the process as that such sensitivity will
be blunted.
It has also been argued that finality would prevent certain cases
from reaching the Supreme Court that would serve as vehicles for important change of doctrine but would not be recognized by the National Court of Appeals as having this potential. But when the
Supreme Court issues thunderbolts they rarely come out of a cloudless
sky. The Supreme Court, through its rules, through expressions in
its opinions and in dissents, would have abundant opportunity to signal
the vitality of certain issues. Moreover, when the Supreme Court has
made a somewhat unexpected re-examination of doctrine it has done
so characteristically in a case that was one of a series reaching the
Court. If the decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins9 was unexpected, still there would have been opportunities to overrule Swift
v. Tyson10 in the numerous cases that would have been certified to
the Court by a National Court of Appeals if one had existed during
the regime of a federal common law. Similarly, the new doctrine
announced in Gideon v. Wainwright" could have been promulgated
9. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
11. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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in any of the right-to-counsel cases that would have been certified to
the Supreme Court under the pre-existing constitutional standards.
Again, a vehicle for the Miranda2 rules could have been found in any
of the cases that would have reached the Supreme Court for review
under the prior tests of voluntariness of confessions.
Since some suggestion has been made that there is a constitutional barrier to a preliminary screening process, brief note should be
taken of the point. Since Article III of the Constitution mandates
"one Supreme Court," the argument runs, the Supreme Court must
be given final authority to review cases decided by lower federal
courts; otherwise, they and not the Supreme Court would be "supreme." If this argument is seriously applied, all of the Judiciary Acts
from the beginning to the present have been unconstitutional. For
at no time has the full scope of the judicial power of the federal courts
been linked to review in the Supreme Court. Congress has always
exercised its power under Article III to confer appellate jurisdiction
on the Supreme Court "with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as Congress shall make." At the beginning, for example, there
was a higher jurisdictional amount for appeal to the Supreme Court
than for access to the district courts. Even if the argument is tailored
to apply only to constitutional and other federal questions it is undermined by history. For a hundred years, until 1891, federal criminal
cases could not be appealed to the Supreme Court except where there
was a certificate of division in the circuit court below. In all such
cases it could be said that the lower court was "supreme," but Article
III never received any such reading. The Supreme Court remained
supreme in the pertinent sense: no other court had authority to overrule or reverse its decisions, and in the event of inconsistency a decision of the Supreme Court prevailed. But the scope of its appellate
jurisdiction, in contrast to its original jurisdiction, has been set by Congress.
A somewhat modified form of the objection drawn from Article
III is that a court, or at any rate the Supreme Court, must have power
to decide what cases it chooses to decide, and that the preliminary
decision cannot be "delegated." But this, with respect, begs the question. The Supreme Court has no authority or responsibility with re12. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In some ninety-five cases pending on the docket that raised the same issue, the Court, with Justices Black and Douglas dissenting, denied the petitions, thus indicating that concern for particular litigants
was not a paramount consideration. See, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719
(1966).
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spect to cases where a statutory condition precedent to its jurisdiction
has not been met. Suppose that Congress, instead of conditioning
criminal appeals for a century on a certificate of division, had required
a certificate of probable cause from the circuit court. Then suppose
that, to make the plan more just, Congress vested the certificating
function in circuit judges other than those who decided the case.
Would such a plan have been more vulnerable constitutionally than
the one actually employed? Article Ill imposes no such imported
limitations on the administration of the appellate system. The choice
is in truth open.
The choice is really between two models for the Supreme Court.
One model is that of a bureaucratic agency, which copes with a mounting work load by greater and greater separation of responsibility for
a function and its actual performance, retaining nominal responsibility
at the top while delegating actual judgment to others. The other
model is that of a small community of thinkers, who keep themselves
free for their central task by shedding ancillary and less essential responsibilities. If the Supreme Court is regarded as an assembly-line
operation, a high-speed, high-volume enterprise, the 'bureaucratic model
is appropriate. If its function is different, if its duty is to clarify and
advance our highest law through the most deliberative of procedures,
then the other model is the more appropriate.
Perhaps in a choice of models I have been unduly influenced by
my introduction to the work of the Supreme Court through a clerkship
with Justice Brandeis, underscoring as it did the deliberative side of
the judicial process. Justice Brandeis spoke appreciatively of having
been allowed the full time of a conference to lead a discussion on
depreciation accounting. If a draft opinion was ready for circulation
in the middle of the week he withheld -it until the beginning of the
next week, so that his colleagues would not be rushed in considering
it before conference. When Justice Sutherland returned a draft opinion with a number of queries on the statement of facts and the law, Brandeis asked me to check the queries carefully. After doing so I reported somewhat condescendingly that they were all unfounded and
that Justice Sutherland might have saved time by not raising them.
Justice Brandeis cut me off, saying that he was very glad Justice
Sutherland had written as he did, because it showed he was doing his
job.
The caseload presents, in an ideal sense, an insoluble problem.
Some sacrifices are involved in any solution, as was true when circuitriding was abolished, when regional courts of appeals were established
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in 1891, and when discretionary instead of obligatory review became
the pattern in 1925. Vehement objections were raised to each of
these reforms. It is important to keep one's perspective, to perceive
what is most essential and to eschew the hyperbole of doom. What
has been written about a reform enacted in 1731 in England, making
English the language of court proceedings, strikes the right note:
The nation at large needed it, some wise men predicted it
would ruin England, some still wiser men seized upon minor inconveniences that resulted from it as quite sufficient to damn it,
and succeeding generations wondered why it had not passed a century earlier. 1 3
13.

1 P.

WINFIELD, CHIEF SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY

13 (1925).

